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Transcendental or Material Oscillation? 
An Alternative Reading of Friedrich Schlegel's 
Alternating Principle ( Wechselerweis) 
In his review of EH. Jacobi's Woldemar, which appeared in Reich-
ardt's journal Deutschland in I796, (KFSA 11, 70-74) Schlegel over-
stepped the narrow boundaries of a strict literary review and used the 
opportunity to characterize Jacobi's philosophy as a whole. Against 
the requirements of philosophical reason, which Jacobi believed nec-
essarily succumbed to either a "consistent" dogmatism or the "mere 
shadows" of idealism, Jacobi had embraced a philosophy of "belief" 
(Glauben), of "wondrous revelation" (Offenbarung) opposed to every 
form of reason. According to Schlegel, Jacobi had reduced philoso-
phy to "der in Begriffe und Worte gebrachte Geist eines Individuellen 
Lebens," (KFSA 11, 71) and had thereby failed to recognize the two 
most basic suppositions of philosophy, namely the will to truth and the 
striving for a systematic, scientific totality. Schlegel wrote: "Aber nur 
wenn Streben nach Wahrheit und Wissenschaft die Seele dieses Lebens 
ist, kann der Geist desselben philosophisch genannt werden." (KFSA 
11, 71) As is often the case with Schlegel, there is an inherent ambigu-
ity with regard to these two claims. It hinges on whether we place the 
emphasis on the "will" and "striving" or on the claim to scientific 
systematicity and totality. With this statement, and in the text which 
followed it, Schlegel began his philosophical inquiry into the status 
of the basic philosophical proposition (Grundsatz). The notion that 
philosophy must and could be grounded in one, fundamental propo-
sition, specifically, the basic proposition of consciousness (Satz des 
Bewußtseins), had been advanced by Karl Leonhard Reinhold in his 
Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens 
(I789) and - in a more systematic fashion - by J.G. Fichte in the vari-
ous versions of his Wissenschaftslehre, beginning in I794. Skepticism 
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regarding such a project was also widespread.! Schlegel forged his own 
response, not merely to Jacobi's departure from reason, but also to 
Fichte's idealism and the emergent radical skepticism of the time. The 
result of his critique, his reply to Fichte's fundamental proposition 
(Grundsatz) and Jacobi's critique that the final ground is "inexplicable" 
and ultimately based on belief/faith, was the Wechselerweis, or what 
has come to be called the "alternating principle."2 Navigating through 
Reinhold, Jacobi, and Fichte, Schlegel was exploring a new form of 
doing philosophy. It required three things: the absence of foundations, 
communicativity, and interdisciplinarity. 
In the last ten years, Friedrich Schlegel's early philosophical theory 
I795~I800 has been the focal point of are-evaluation of the Romantic 
reception and transformation of German idealist philosophy, Fichte's 
Wissenschafts lehre in particular. This theory emerges in the context of 
the philosophical debate in Jena in the years I795~97, as a result of 
Schlegel's reaction to the skepticism regarding first-principles circulat-
ing around Jena at the time and as a complex process of Schlegel's 
appropriation and critique ~ his "working through" ~ various exist-
ing philosophical positions, above all, those of Spinoza, F.H. Jacobi, 
and J.G. Fichte. Much of the scholarship that emerged in the I990S 
concerned the nature, status, and function of Schlegel's "alternating 
principle," what he hirnself in various iterations termed Wechselerweis, 
Wechselgrund, Wechselgrundsatz, Wechselbeweis, Wechselbegriff, and 
Wechselbestimmung. In Schlegel's writing during the period in ques-
tion, this "principle" is articulated as a direct antipode to and attack 
on the absolute, unconditional fundamental principle (Grundsatz) of 
philosophy postulated by Fichte in his Grundlagen der gesamten Wis-
senschaftslehre and Über den Begriff der Wissenschafts lehre of 1794, 
"1=1". Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre did not conclude, of course, with 
the "original proposition" "1=1"; he additionally specified a secondary, 
conditional and derivative supplement to this original and absolutely 
unconditional proposition ~ "Not-I" ~ and formulated the relation 
of the two propositions in terms of an alternating determination 
(Wechselbestimmung). (SW I, ro8f, 131, I40~I4I, 153, 185) However, 
Schlegel's "alternating principle" implies a conception of philosophi-
On the "grundsatzphilosophische Skepsis" of Franz Paul von Rerbert, Johann Ben-
jamin Erhard, and Carl Christi an Erhard Schmid, see: Frank I996a, 403-436. 
2 There has been suggestive and interesting work relating the romantic notion of 
oscillation to Blanchot and to contemporary philosophy, specifically Critchley 
2004, 38 and Critchley 2005, SI-52. 
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cal activity that has dispensed with the requirement for a singular, 
fundamental, first principle altogether. Schlegel's "alternation" begins 
to articulate the relationality of determinations and the performativity 
of positing, on the one hand no longer grounded in the one, absolute, 
fundamental principle (Grundsatz), and, on the other, limiting and 
self-limiting in terms of their intrinsic materiality, contingency, and 
connectivity. This was, in my view, a direct result of Schlegel's anti-
transcendental, hermeneutical-philological strategy that he was for-
mulating at the same time and achieved its most precise formulation 
in his notebooks Zur Philologie (1797).3 
In this essay, my aim is twofold: first, I will discuss three existing 
readings of Schlegel's "alternating principle" - readings offered by 
the late Ernst Behler, Manfred Frank, and Guido Naschert - in order 
to present the existing scholarship on the subject and to point out 
what I see as a shared underlying transcendental argument present in 
these readings. Secondly, I will off er an alternative argument of this 
principle that questions the transcendental version of the 'alternating 
principle.' My reading locates Schlegel's alternating or oscillating prin-
ciple within a very different philosophical discourse: an anti-founda-
tionalist, material-hermeneutic discourse in which one does not begin 
with any absolutely secure and isolated fundamental principles, but 
rather, any such basic principles are gained in an oscillating action 
from a micrology 0/ the particular (Buchstabe) and through intra- and 
interdisciplinary suspension of boundaries. Schlegel's is not merely a 
critique of the Grundsatz; more significantly, the positing (setzen) of 
the principle, one could say its rhetoricalor discursive function, is 
wrested from what I view as a transcendental philosophy 0/ the subject 
that persists in the existent readings. 
In Schlegel's counter-discourse, the "alternating principle" is histo-
ricized, temporalized, set into motion, deployed as part of historical 
and philological critique of transcendental philosophy and idealism. 
By questioning such a transcendental reading of Schlegel's "alternat-
ing principle," we do not seek to undermine the systematic interest and 
intent of Schlegel's discourse. And this is where I think there has been 
confusion in the existing scholarship: the conflation of foundations 
and systematicity. Schlegel does not depart from the philosophical 
project altogether. Quite the contrary, Schlegel's critique demands 
3 The notebooks Zur Philologie 1& II are in KFSA, Vol. XVI. They are also avail-
able now as electronic text thanks to the work of Dr. Volker Deubel at the Univer-
sity of Munich Text-Archive: http://mut.mhn.de/. 
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systematicity that historicizes the philosophical project and engages 
it with other disciplines, specifically philology and rhetoric. This dis-
tinction - the requirement of an historical and systematic, cyclical 
procedure in contradistinction to the transcendental operation - will 
prove decisive in the considerations below, where the critique of the 
transcendentalleads to a material hermeneutics. What is at stake in 
such a reading and in its distinction to the transcendental interpreta-
tion is not merely our understanding of the nature and role of German 
romantic philosophy, currently an important topic of considerable 
debate,4 but how we situate this important impulse within the broader 
constellation of the emergence of the modern 'humanities.' The recent 
rehabilitation of the philosophy of the subject has contributed to and 
been influenced by this reading of early German romantic philosophy, 
especially in the case of the work of Manfred Frank. (Frank 1997, 
875-913; Frank I996b) But the transcendental reading of Schlegel's 
alternating principle has also run parallel to more recent historical 
reconstructions of post-Kantian idealism in general as weIl, many of 
which, to some extent, also read Schlegel's theory as an appropriation, 
an extension or adaptation of transcendental philosophy.5 This essay 
seeks to interrogate what I view to be a dominant, one-sided idealistic-
transcendental reading of Schlegel's alternating principle, to counter it 
with a reconstruction in which the material, discursive, and (inter-)dis-
ciplinary force of Schlegel's arguments co me more clearly to the fore. 
The first explicit thematization of Schlegel's "alternating principle" 
as far as I have been able to detect was in 1975, when the late Ernst 
Behler noted in his excellent introduction to Volume VIII of the 
Kritische Friedrich Schlegel Ausgabe "Schlegels frühe Position in der 
Ausbildung der idealistischen Philosophie" the following: "Dass für 
[Schlegel] ein 'bedingter und bedingender Wechselerweis der Grund 
der Philosophie' war, zeigte sich bereits in der lacobi-Rezension 
und ist ein beherrschender Gedanke seiner frühen philosophischen 
Heften." (Behier 1963, xlii) Behler was referring to Schlegel's review 
of lacobi's Woldemar. There, Schlegel wrote: 
4 To mention just a few of the most important contributions: Michael Elsässer 199 I; 
Frank 1997 and 2003; Beiser 2003. 
5 See, for example, Henrich 1992,127: "Synthesen von Fichte und Spinoza, der über 
Jacobi angeeignet wurde, sind wenig später von vielen ausgearbeitet worden. Die 
bedeutendsten unter ihnen sind Novalis und Friedrich Schlegel gewesen." Also, 
Henrich 1991, 228. On Henrich's view, it is Hölderlin who makes the decisive 
break, preparing the way for Schelling and Hegel, with his concept of Seyn. 
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- Was Jacobi dafür anführt: ,daß jeder Erweis schon etwas Erwiese-
nes voraussetze' (Spin. S. 225); gilt nur wider diejenigen Denker, wel-
che von einem einzigen Erweis ausgehn. Wie wenn nun aber ein von 
außen unbedingter, gegenseitig aber bedingter und sich bedingender 
. Wechselerweis der Grund der Philosophie ware? (KFSA H, 72) 
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Referring to the second edition of Jacobi's Über die Lehre des Spi-
noza (1789), Schlegel's "alternating principle" suggests an alternative 
to Jacobi's critique of an infinite regressio!'!ßnd initiates aseries of 
discursive attempts to place philosophy in relation to philology, his-
tory, and rhetoric. 
Schlegel was not completely dismissive of Jacobi's critique. What 
Schlegel sees in Jacobi is an obsessive compulsion for consistency, 
a fear of allowing the "offenbare Widersprüche, Fehlschlüsse und 
Zweideutigkeiten"6 to emerge fully. Jacobi's polemic is valid, in Schle-
gel's view, for those thinkers who feel compelled to reduce philosophy 
to one, fundamental principle. In this, Schlegel identifies enormous 
value in the polemical element of Jacobi's thought; in discerning 
the insufficiency of a fully rational final grounding, Jacobi actu-
ally touched upon the "herrschende[n] Denkart des Zeitalters mit 
kritischem Geist." (KFSA 11, 71) Thus, Schlegel expressed tremen-
dous respect for the critical, polemical side of Jacobi, while at the 
same time "psychoanalyzing" hirn as being fearful of contradiction 
and ambiguity,1 as having maintained the duplicitous position of not 
having retreated from the philosophical path completely, and yet at 
the same moment having abandoned phiIosophy to mere belief and 
revelation. 
According to the three critics I will consider in this paper - Ernst 
Behler, Manfred Frank, and Guido Naschert - there is consensus that 
Schlegel develops his own unique philosophical position in late 1796. 
Schlegel first criticizes and then decisively departs from the single, 
absolute, fundamental principle or Grundsatz of Fichte's Wissenschafts-
lehre and argues for an "alternating principle," a translation of the 
terms Wechselgrundsatz or Wechselerweis. On this, I am in complete 
6 KFSA 11, 72: "Er hätte es nicht über sich gewinnen können, offenbare Wider-
sprüche, Fehlschlüsse und Zweideutigkeiten durch genialischen Tiefsinn in einzel-
nen Stellen, durch die vorteilhafteste Beleuchtung, und sogar durch Autoritäten 
vor seinen eigenen und fremden Augen zu verstecken ... " 
7 KFSA 11, 72: "War es etwa Furcht, was ihn [Jacobi, RL] zurückhielt, weiter zu 
forschen?" This is a slight corrective to Lauth 1971. 
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agreement with the extant readings. To be sure, Schlegel's rejection of 
Fichte's Grundsatz is symptomatic of a more general anti-foundation-
alist and anti-transcendental tendency that was being articulated by a 
circle of students in Jena at the time. However, Schlegel's critique and 
his unique attempt to articulate a distinct theory set hirn apart from 
the skeptical attitude of the day. (Frank 1996a, 413-414) 
While it is therefore now widely accepted that 179S-96 is the deci-
sive moment in Schlegel's philosophical development, there is no such 
consensus regarding Schlegel's departure from the idea of a single, 
absolute, indubitable grounding principle (Grundsatz), as it had been 
expressed in Fichte's Über den Begriff der Wissenschafts lehre of 1794. 
Schlegel's turning away from the absolute principle was influenced by 
the skeptical position that became widely discussed in the philosophi-
cal culture around Jena at the time, a type of anti-foundationalism, 
some would say skepticism, that was being expressed in student circles 
in Jena in 179S. Ehrhard, Herbert, and Niethammer all adopted varia-
tions of this skeptical, irreverent position vis-a-vis the Grundsucherei, 
the perceived obsession with a foundational principle, and rnocked all 
attempts to arrive at a basic and indubitable proposition that could 
serve as the ground for all philosophy. Much of this skepticism can be 
traced back to Jacobi and, according to Dieter Henrich, to the work 
of the earl Immanuel Diez. (Heinrich 1991, 240-24S) Schlegel read 
Jacobi's Über die Lehre des Spinoza very carefully, grasped its conse-
quences fully, and took those consequences seriously: the Philosophical 
Fragments of 1796 (KFSA XVIII, SOS-S21) provide a sketch of Schle-
gel's philosophical work at this time, and the philosophical positions 
he was studying and trying to work though. Schlegel sought a fourth 
path, one could say, beyond the skeptical stance, Jacobi's critique of 
the fundamental principle, and Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre. This new 
path Schlegel embarks upon and utilizes is the alternating principle 
(Wechselerweis), an oscillating or shifting mediation not rnerely at the 
level of subjectivity, but between subjects, within specific disciplines 
of knowledge, and finally between disciplines. What will emerge in 
the course of this reconstruction will provide, I hope, guideposts for 
an alternative reading to Schlegel's "alternating principle" and clear 
the way for a re-appraisal of Friedrich Schlegel's early philosophical 
development. Because of the centrality of the Wechselerweis, it might 
even suggest a re-assessment of early German romantic philosophy 
more generally. 
The paper consists of four sections. In Part I, I ex amine Ernst 
Behler's important paper of 1996 on the alternating principle. Behler 
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traced the "alternating principle" to Schlegel's elaboration of Wechsel 
in his early historical-poetic and philological writings, prior to the 
encounter with Fichte. In Part 11, Manfred Frank's reading of the 
Wechselerweis as presented in two central papers of 1996 and his col-
lection of essays of 1997, which, taken together, constitute the most 
sustained engagement with this material, is considered. In Part 111, 
the transcendental-pragmatic reading of Guido Naschert published 
in Athenäum. Jahrbuch für Romantik 1996 and 1997 is interrogated. 
And in Part IV, I discuss Schlegel's critique of Fichte and suggest an 
alternative reading of Schlegel's "alternating principle" that, in my 
view, more adequately captures Schlegel's anti-transcendental, mate-
rial philological-hermeneutical approach developed in 1796-1797. I 
first present the central passages where Schlegel essays the "alternat-
ing principle," and then suggest a path of studying Schlegel's theory 
of alternation once we have dispensed with the idealistic framework 
and have purged the remaining transcendental residues that have 
continued to inform the scholarship on this important principle since 
1996- 1997. 
I. The Idealism of Ernst Behler's Reading 
In the introduction to Volume VIII of the KFSA, Ernst Behler elu-
cidated Schlegel's early philosophical development as areaction to 
Jacobi's attack on reason. Schlegel viewed Jacobi as an enemy of rea-
son ("Feind der Vernunft") (BehIer 1963, xxx). For Schlegel, Jacobi's 
rejection of reason in his critique of Spinoza condemned hirn to the 
position of a "passive Mystic," or a "mystical Sophist." (KFSA I, 104; 
KFSA 11,26,89) Schlegel considered Jacobi's philosophy of belief to 
suffer frorn a lack of "criticisrn." (BehIer 1963, xxxii) According to 
Schlegel, Jacobi had abandoned the fundamental instincts of philoso-
phy - scientific systematicity and truth - and had plunged philosophi-
cal thinking into an abyss of superstition (Aberglauben), excessive 
enthusiasm and excessive sentimentality (Schwärmerei). (KFSA 11, 
70) Jacobi's exclusive emphasis on belief and his profound mistrust of 
reason could not be reconciled with philosophy, according to Schle-
gel; philosophy required a striving after scientific systematicity and 
comprehensiveness and truth. (KFSA 11, 71) If Jacobi's critique of 
the fundamental principle had led hirn to a religious, individualistic 
philosophy of belief based on a pure act of faith, Schlegel defended 
the philosophical project while rejecting the necessity of a single, abso-
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lute foundational principle which had been put forward by Reinhold 
and Fichte. 
Behler's reading of this problematics in his article "Friedrich Schle-
gel's Theory of an Alternating Principle prior to his arrival in Jena 
(6 August 1796)" (Behier 1996) offered a crucial perspective on the 
nature and origins of the "alternating principle." Behler identified the 
origin of the idea of an "alternating principle" in Schlegel's reading 
of and critical engagement with Jacobi's argument that the system 
of reason has no solid grounding and must enter into a reductio ad 
infinitum. (Behier 1996, 384-385) He underscored the significance of 
Schlegel's decisive meeting with Novalis in Weißenfels in late July and 
August 1796, where the discourse of alternation and oscillation can be 
gleaned from both the fragments and the subsequent letters between 
them. 8 In his work on this early phase of German romantic philoso-
phy, Manfred Frank has mentioned Schlegel's use of the notion of 
alternation in his early philological writings on classical antiquity only 
briefly, (Frank 1997, 889) whereas Behler was very precise in locating 
the earliest appearance of the phrase. Behler actually showed the pres-
ence and function of "alternation" in the distinct sense of Wechsel in 
Schlegel's early philological writings. He concluded that "alternation" 
or "change"(Wechsel) was at first a quality of the poetic, a poetic-
historical relation in which two conflicting or oppositional principles 
interact and are mediated with one another. Only later, according to 
this view, did it evolve into a philosophical principle. In the article of 
1996, Behler wrote: 
The instances of the text on alternation which seem to be prior to 
and independent of a Fichtean impact develop this term as a poetic 
principle, independent of philosophical speculation and transcen-
dental philosophy. They are descriptive and point out a poetic qua-
lity to a high degree. Alternation in a work of poetry, drama, and 
literature, fuses two opposite elements on an equallevel by combi-
ning and dissolving them. (Behier 1996, 389) 
Behler explicitly cites three different meanings/usages of the notion of 
alternation in the early philological writings: I) Schlegel's character-
8 See Frank I997, 889. Frank differs from Behler on this point in that he does not 
place much significance on the philological origins of Schlegel's Wechselerweis in 
Schlegel's writings on classical drama. For Frank, Wechselerweis is a fundamen-
tally philosophical proposition, not essentially linked to Wechsel as a dramatic 
category or as a poetic quality. 
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ization of the fiuctuating principle present in the drama of Sophocles; 
2) his characterization of Goethe as the modern poet who, in his writ-
ings, often activated an alternation between conflicting or oppositional 
poetic modalities, in this case between tranquility or equilibrium on 
the one hand and activity, fiuctuation, and change on the other; 3) 
the alternation of the affects of the mind as a response to opposing 
aesthetic practices.9 What is striking is that Behler sees, besides the 
Anstoß provided by Jacobi's Spinoza-Book, Schlegel's early confron-
tation with questions concerning philology and poetics as being in 
some way decisive for the development of his theory of the "alter-
nating principle." Even more interesting for our purposes is Behler's 
separation of the earliest instances of alternation in Schlegel from 
philosophical speculation and transcendental philosophy. 
This line of argument, however, stops rather abruptly in Behler's 
essay. As Schlegel begins to appropriate and evaluate Fichte's Wis-
senschaftslehre, the notion of Wechsel shifts from being a historical-
poetic argumentational figure to a method of philosophical thinking. 
Behler pointed to Schlegel's reception and review of Fichte's early 
philosophical writings for Niethammer's journal, to Fichte's presence 
in Schlegel's Über das Studium der griechischen Poesie (1795-97), parts 
of which were written after Schlegel had become acquainted with and 
began his critical assessment of Fichte's philosophy (wh ich can be 
dated to August 1795), and, finally, to Schlegel's reading of Fichte's 
essays Die Bestimmung des Gelehrten (1794) and "Über die Sprach-
fahigkeit" of 1795. Whereas Behler had observed, correct1y in my 
view, that "[ ... ] there is no space in Fichte for an alternating principle, 
since everything evolves from one ultimate principle (Grundsatz)," 
(Behier 1996, 394-395) that "what can be ascertained [ ... ] is how 
deeply the idea of alternation and oscillation is rooted in Schlegel's 
own discourse and that he did not need any informant to articulate 
it," (Behier 1996, 386) Fichte suddenly took center stage once again in 
Behler's reconstruction when it became a matter of identifying the pri-
mal scene of the alternating principle itself. Behler had uncovered the 
emergence not merely of the notion of Wechsel, but the very idea of 
an alternating action prior to and independently of Schlegel's reading 
of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre and Fichte's other essays from 1794-95 
- specifically, discovering the emergence of the idea of alternation 
9 I am prepared to make the argument that this is based on Schlegel's encounter with 
Spinoza. I have suggested this in the area of interpretation in Leventhal 2007. 
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(Wechsel, not yet as Wechselerweis) in the Studium-Aufsatz, and in the 
characterization of Sophoc1es in particular. Yet the encounter with 
Fichte's "alternating action between freedom and nature," (Behier 
1996, 395) and Schlegel's identification of "a continual alternating 
action" (KFSA 1,290, 301) result for Behler, in the end, from Schle-
gel's reading and appropriation of Fichte. Behler notes that it was 
most precisely in his conversations with Novalis in Weißenfels July-
August I796 concerning Fichte's philosophy that this "alternating 
turn" comes about. In his reading of the critical reception of Fichte in 
the joint Fichte-studies of the two young romanties, Behler argues that 
these consisted precisely ''[. .. ] of rising above the confines of Fichte's 
philosophy in an attempt to safeguard the reflective and self-critical 
mobility of the mind [my emphasis, RL] from any disciplinary (phi-
losophy) and systematic (doctrine of knowledge) fixation." (Behier 
1996, 398) It is precisely through this turn toward the subject, signaled 
by a transcendental gesture that is supposed to protect the reflective, 
self-critical mobility of the mind from (empirieal) disciplinary and 
systematic intrusion, however, that Behler in my view departs from the 
unique, material character of Schlegelian alternation. In this diversion 
from the literary, philological-historical reading, Behler re-invokes the 
subjective moment as the cornerstone of alternation. Behler was cor-
reet, I believe, in reading Schlegel's basic point of departure as an 
attempt to rupture the confines - read the Grundsatz of "1=1" - of 
Fichte's project, but not in his supposition that this was an attempt to 
"safeguard the reflective and critical mobility of the mind."10 Rather, 
Schlegel's opposition was designed to provoke a relational, differen-
tiating, and interdisciplinary approach to philosophy, placing it in an 
alternating loop with history and philology; not to protect or defend 
("safeguard") the activity of the mind, but to re-interpret the suppos-
edly originary unity of mind as multiple and fluctuating. 
In my view, Behler had the first part exactly right: Schlegel's read-
ing of Fichte beginning in 1795 indicates an intensification of the 
rhetoric of interaction, oscillation, alternation, or reciprocity. Yet 
Schlegel had already employed the notion of alternation and oscilla-
10 Here, one can remark the persistence of Walter Benjamin's view of Schlegel's 
appropriation of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, namely in the figure of "unendliche 
Reflexion." However, Benjamin's point was precisely that this "unendliche reflex-
ion" in Schlegel is displaced into the medium of the work of art itself, and not 
simply an infinite movement or agility of the "mind." See: Benjamin 1973. Cf. also 
Behler 1963, lix. 
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tion as a historical-poetic category. Schlegel's actual formulations of 
the "alternating principle" (Wechselerweis) beginning in 1796 were a 
profound departure from, and a conscious appropriation and revision 
of Fichte's Wechselbestimmung rather than an attempt to "safeguard 
the refiective and critical mobility of the mind" against disciplinary 
and systematic fixation. 
Behler's historical reconstruction had the distinct advantage of hav-
ing undertaken the task of philological research into the actual emer-
gence of the notions of alternation and alternating action in Schlegel's 
early philological work. Nevertheless, several difficulties of Behler's 
reading have become apparent: I) the semantic field of the term 
"alternating principle" has been expanded to include a host of other 
terms whose precise relation(s) to the Wechselerweis remain obscure. 
In particular, it is unclear how the polysemous notion of Wechsel-
oscillation, change, shift - in poetic tone or quality relates to and can 
be read as the precursor of the alternating principle as a philosophical 
construct. At best, it would seem that classical drama (Sophocles) and, 
in modern literature, Goethe provide examples or Beispiele of such 
alternation, something Schlegel woulddevelop. Secondly, (2) although 
Behler successfully drew our attention to the notion of alternation and 
oscillation in Schlegel's early philological writings, Schlegel's debate 
with Jacobi, specifically in the context of his engagement with Fichte, 
reemerges (in a manner quite similar to Manfred Frank) as the primal 
scene of the alternating principle. Behler did not consider other key 
formulations of the "alternating principle" that displaya very differ-
ent profile. How does the alternating principle as a reading of Fichte 
secure "the refiective and self-critical mobility of the mind" from any 
systematic, philosophical fixation when it is precisely systematic and 
philosophical rigor that Schlegel had insisted upon against Jacobi? 
More fundamentally, how does the Fichtean self-positing activity of 
the "I" as a Tathandlung reassert itself into Schlegel's critique in the 
rhetoric of "the reflective and self-critical mobility of the mimi"? This 
reading places Schlegel squarely back into the framework of an ideal-
istic philosophy of consciousness, situating "infinite refiection" in the 
pure activity of self-consciousness. Behler's polemic against fixation 
has merit. However, a distinction must be made between philosophy 
striving for truth and systematic totality, which Schlegel actually 
upheld against Jacobi, and, on the other hand, the reduction of phi-
losophy to one foundational principle. The two - systematicity and 
foundationalism - need not be conjoined, and Schlegel consistently 
104 Robert S. Leventhal 
advocated the necessity of the former in philosophy, even after 1797 
and in the Romantic phase,Il while tenaciously attacking the latter. 
We might therefore already at this point conjecture that Schlegel's 
Wechselerweis is not so much concerned with the "reflective and self-
critical mobility of the mind" (BehIer) - which announces an adher-
ence to the philosophy of the subject and of consciousness - as it is 
with the project to cut a third path beyond Jacobi's invective against 
reason and Fichte's insistence on one, and only one, absolute, foun-
dational principle as the ground for all philosophy. Behler gave us 
the important starting-point of a genuine historical reconstruction 
precisely by stating the difference between Fichtean and Schlegelian 
alternation: Schlegel's alternation, according to Behler, "remains 
in the realm of finitude" (BehIer 1996, 402) in contradistinction to 
Fichte, its origins not in search of an absolute fundamental first 
principle, but in the oscillation or fluctuation between different and 
differing theses, modalities of thought and discourse, and finally vari-
ous disciplines that require each other in order to produce useful and 
interesting interpretive action. By bringing the discussion back into a 
critical reflective capacity of mind, however, Behler questioned his own 
reading that sought to dislodge Schlegel's alternating principle from 
the dominance of the Fichte's and Reinhold'sl2 attempts to deduce the 
totality of being from a single, primary act of thetic consciousness. 
(BehIer 1996, 399-400) 
11. The Return cf the Subject in Manfred Frank's 
Idealistic Reading cf Schlegel's Alternating Principle 
The first systematic, explicit reading of the "alternating principle" 
(Wechselerweis) was carried out by Manfred Frank, first in his 1996 
article '''Wechselgrundsatz': Friedrich Schlegels philosophischer Aus-
gangspunkt" (Frank 1996b), and then in a slighdy more comprehen-
sive way in his book, actually a collection of lectures, that had the tide 
11 Even in the Athenäumsfragmente, "System" is posited as a necessary point of 
resistance to the "Fragment," and the systematicity of the system is never simply 
given up or abandoned. On the importance of the system, and particularly the 
"system-subject," see: Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy 1986, espe-
cially 28-3 1. 
12 K.L. Reinhold, Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermoe-
gens, Prag und Jena, 1789. On Reinhold, see: Henrich 1991, 117, and Henrich 1992, 
787f. On Reinhold's "Grundsatzkrise" of 1792, see: Frank 1996a, 410-413. 
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'Unendliche Annäherung': Die Anfänge der philosophischen Frühroman-
tik, published in 1997.13 Frank's argument states that Schlegel's recep-
tion and transformation of the critical philosophy was the single most 
decisive and significant break from Reinhold's and Fichte's attempt to 
philosophize from an originary absolute principle. In Frank's reading, 
in agreement with Behler, Schlegel develops the explicit "altemating 
principle" for the first time in a critical response to Jacobi's Spinoza-
study (Über die Lehre des Spinoza 1785; 2nd edition 1789) in his review 
of Jacobi's Woldemar in 1796. (KFSA II, 72; Frank 1997, 875) Frank 
wrote: 
Daß der höchste Grundsatz der Philosophie nur ein 'Wechselerweis' 
sein kann, soll hier einfach bedeuten, daß ein Begriff oder ein Satz 
allein nicht per se, sozusagen aus cartesianischer Evidenz, sondern 
erst durch einen weiteren und zweiten (vorläufig) begründet wird [ ... ] 
Genau das war aber eine Grundeinsicht, die Jacobi in der 2. Auflage 
seines Spinoza-Buchleins formuliert hatte. (Frank 1997,929) 
On Frank's view, then, Schlegel's critique was areiteration of the 
critique Jacobi had lodged against Fichte in his Über die Lehre des 
Spinoza: every concept or principle must itself be grounded through 
another concept or principle ad infinitum. But there is a key differ-
ence between Jacobi's fe ar of an infinite regression and Schlegel's 
postulate of an altemating principle that Frank elides here. We have 
stated that Schlegel was dissatisfied with the existent claims concem-
ing the absolute, all of which he believed were guilty of "mysticism." 
Schlegel was equally skeptical, however, of the claims that denied not 
merely the possibility of our knowledge or experience of the abso-
lute, but the absolute itself. At this time - the Fall of 1796 and the 
Winter 1796/97 - Schlegel was engaged with Fichte's philosophy, but 
was disconcerted with Fichte's fundamental principle. He seems to 
have shared Novalis' critique, as we are able to glean from a letter 
dated 14 June 179T "Fichte kann nicht aus der W[issenschafts]L[ehre] 
heraus, wenigstens nicht ohne eine Selbstversetzung [my emphasis, 
RL], die mir unmöglich erscheint." (KFSA XXIII, 372) Schlegel's 
mention of a necessary self-displacement (Selbstversetzung), impos-
sible within Fichte's system, is of decisive importance, for it reveals 
what was to become for hirn a central component of the altemating 
13 Available in English in abbreviated form as: Manfred Frank, The Philosophi-
cal Foundations of Early German Romanticism, trans. Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert, 
Albany: SUNY Press, 2003. 
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principle, which cannot consist in an originary, absolute positing of 
identity, but rather requires the opposition and resistance of an Other 
- Schlegel often refers to the Gegner in this context - in order to func-
tion at all, a process of self-estrangement or alienation and opening 
of itself toward an Other which then allows it to (tentatively) posit 
itself as part of a process of extrinsic relation and mediation. Frank 
is in agreement with Behler that the first signs of the fundamental 
departure from the Fichtean Grundsatzgedanke were present already 
in Schlegel's aesthetic and classical-philological writings of 1794: "In 
seinen antikenwissenschaftlichen und ästhetischen Arbeiten der Jahre 
1794 bis zum Frühling 1796, ja eigentlich bis Sommer 1796 hatte er 
[Schlegel, RL] sich ganz vorbehaltlos, ja mit Emphase auf Fichtes 
Gedanke einer Ableitung aus unbezweifelbarem Prinzip verlassen." 
(Frank 1996b, 30) For Frank, however, the parity of (finite) conscious-
ness and the infinite, or of the individual and the totality (to be sure, 
as an interpretation of Spinoza's Sv xat nav) constitutes this "relative" 
self-identity, (Frank 1996b, 32) and precisely at this point the latent 
idealism of Frank's position becomes evident: "Denn das in sich abge-
schlossene, das vollbestimmte Absolute wäre beides: Einheit des Einen 
und des Unendlichen," (Frank 1996b, 38) as if Schlegel's discourse 
presumed or prefigured the speculative unity of the individual and the 
infinite in a decidedly Hegelian fashion; as if the alternation must be 
speculatively completed and "comprehended" in a final unity of the 
finite (consciousness) and the infinite (the absolute). 
Schlegel's departure from the idea of a first, fundamental principle 
in the Fall of 1796 has to do at the most basic level with his critique 
of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, which can be enunciated along three 
distinct lines: I) the "1=1" identity must undergo a transformation, 
it cannot persist completely unchanged, in the act of positing the 
"Not-I"; the very thetic act of setzen initiates a self-displacement;14 
2) there is, in addition to the "1=1", a second, and equally significant 
thesis or positing, namely the ethical position of the "[ ought to be" 
or "Das ich soll sein", i.e. it cannot be pure, theoretical or specula-
tive activity, but rather must be supplemented by practical volitional 
activity; and 3) that during and after the process of the this positing 
of itself and the "Not-I", the relationship of the I to itself has been 
shaken or altered so that the "I" that emerges after this process can 
14 Interestingly, Paul Franks 20°5, 294 has recently pointed to the non-circularity 
of rnorallaw and the principle of freedorn in a very sirnilar rnanner to Schlegel's 
critique of Fichte. 
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no longer be the same "I" that was contained in the original Grund-
satz. Fichte, as Schlegel states in his Philosophische Fragmente, Zur 
Wissenschaftslehre of 1796, was not "critical enough": "Auch in der 
W[issenschafts]L[ehre] muss die Methode kritisch sein: das ist Fichte 
nicht." (KFSA XVIII, 8, Nr. 52) Fichte's system becomes for Schlegel 
itself a form of Mysticism: "Wenn F[ichte]s System ächter Mysticis-
mus ist, so muss es sich selbst annihilieren ~ er weiss auch gar nichts 
von Gränze, Eintheilung pp. Es fiiesst alles unaufhaltbar und schran-
kenlos in ewigem Kreislauf fort." (KFSA XVIII, 10, Nr. 70) To pi ace 
this in a more modern idiom, Fichte's idealism unconsciously blurs 
historical and disciplinary boundaries, whereas Schlegel "alternating 
principle" demands a recognition of such boundaries prior to any pro-
ductive, interesting confrontation between historical disciplines, sys-
tems, or disco urs es. The drawing/recognition of boundaries permeates 
Schlegel's philological-hermeneutical dis course at this time. Thus, in 
Zur Philologie, Schlegel states: 
Wenn ein Philologe seine Gränzen so ganz verkennt wie Eichst. 
[Eichstädt] so muß es auch mit der philolog [philologischen] Schärfe 
und Genauigkeit nicht ganz richtig stehn. - Bewunderungswürdig 
an Wolf, wie er s. [seine] Gränzen kennt. (KFSA XVI, 41) 
Was gehört zum Begriff? - Wesen, Grund (Deduction) Grän-
zen Schranken (diff. [differential specif. [specifica] (Wesen Grund 
und Zweck ist bey einem prakt. [praktischen] Begriff einerley.) 
Bestandtheile. Unterschied von <pa [Philosophie] sehr wichtig. Das 
ist das erste. (KFSA XVI, 45) 
Die historische Kenntniß des Alterth. [Alterthums] erfodert eigent-
lich, daß die Kritik schon vollendet sey und die Hermeneutik/ Diese 
beyden Arten der Philologie sind also in Wechselwirkung. Es ist 
wichtig, daß die Gränzen nicht verwirrt werden, wie in der neumo-
digen Interpret. [Interpretazion] auch wohl in der Conjekturazion. 
(KFSA XVI, 38) 
Schlegel's counter-argument, according to Frank, is the alternating 
principle and the "progressive extension of the limits or boundaries of 
knowledge" in an infinite, ongoing "approximation" or Annäherung. 
Frank quotes Schlegel from the Fragments Zur Logik und Philosophie. 
1796: 
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In meinem System ist der letzte Grund wirklich ein Wechselerweis. 
In Fichte's ein Postulat und unbedingter Satz. (KFSA XVIII, 521, 
Nr.22) 
Frank then proceeds to give us the provenance of the "reciprocally 
determining or supporting" propositions that are precisely the content 
of this Wechselerweis. For this, Frank uses a Fragment from the Phil-
osophische Fragmente Erste Epoche. II from 1797-1798: 
Das Ich setzt sich selbst und das Ich soll sich setzen sind wohl mit 
nichten Sätze aus einem höheren; einer ist so hoch als der andere; 
auch sind es zwei Grundsätze, nicht einer. Wechselgrundsatz. (KFSA 
XVIII, 36, Nr. 193) 
There are, for Schlegel, minimally two propositions, neither of which 
is "higher" or more fundamental than the other. The point here is 
that Fichte's Grundsatz is insufficient in two ways: I) it requires the 
additional proposition das Ich soll sein, and is therefore referred to 
practical philosophy, thus demonstrating the first lack or weakness as 
a purely theoretical proposition; 2) secondly, according to Frank, the 
Fichtean proposition das ich soll sich setzen ("the I must posit itself") 
can and does not, for Schlegel, express the absolute that it claims to, 
precisely because this proposition is bestimmt, or determined/condi-
tioned, insofar as it must exclude something from itse1f, must posit 
a "Not-I" over and against itself, and is therefore precisely not self-
sujJicient. Fichte, on Schlegel's reading, is compelled to posit another 
thetic proposition, there must be an additional thetic postulate if 
you will, that of opposition or Gegenwirkung, an Anstoß, a de1imit-
ing activity that cannot be derived from nor reduced to the "I" itself. 
(Frank 1996b, 36) 
Frank's reading of Schlegel's Wechselerweis then undergoes an alter-
ation itse1f: from the "alternating principle" of the self-positing of the 
"I posits itself" and the proposition "The I must posit itself," Frank 
then takes us to the Wechselbegriffe of consciousness and infinity from 
the later lectures on Transzendentalphilosophie. Jena 1800-1801. We 
leave aside here the possible historical-philological objection that these 
passages are taken from lectures held in Jena 1800-1801, after Schlegel 
became acquainted with Schelling's transcendental philosophy (Hein-
rich 1992, 127; p. 127; Elsässer 1991, xxi-xxii), and after the explication 
of the romantic program 1798-1799. Frank summarizes: "Schlegels 
'letzter Grund' ist also erklärtermaßen kein singulärer (Fichte scher) 
Grundsatz, sondern ein Konsortium zweier, ja (nach einigen Frag-
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menten) mehrerer Sätze." (Frank 1996b, 44) Frank hypothesizes that 
Schlegel received the notion from the first Wissenschaftslehre, where 
Fichte uses the concept of Wechselbestimmung to articulate the two 
activities that the absolute Ich engages in the process of its own com-
ing to self-consciousness. Fichte's early Grundriß des Eigenthümlichen 
der Wissenschaftslehre of 1795 already speaks of Wechselwirkung, and 
on several different levels: not merely the relative activity or interaction 
between the land the Not-I, but also in the "free oscillation between 
several possible ways of freely determining the image" that conscious-
ness forms. (Fichte, SW I, 131-146; 381-382) The key phrase here, a 
"consortium" of two or more fundamental principles, misses the radi-
cal discursive innovation occurring in Schlegel's texts. In his essay of 
1980, Werner Hamacher carefully argued the case of the supplemental 
Zusatz of the transcendental imagination (Einbildungskraft) in Fichte 
on which such Wechselbestimmung depends: namely, the imagination, 
which has neither "fixed borders" (keine Feste Grenze) (Fichte SW 
I, 216) nor a "fixed standpoint" (keinen festen Standpunkt) (Fichte, 
SW 1,216) and which Schlegel almost certainly took up and utilized 
for his own sculpting of the "alternating principle." (Harnacher 1980, 
1 165) Other candidates suggest themselves: Novalis, whose Fichte-
Studien exhibit a strong concern for and engagement with the notion 
of reciprocal determination. But the most likely candidate is in fact 
Schlegel's reading and review of Jacobi's Woldemar and his reception 
of Jacobi's Spinoza-Book Über die Lehre des Spinoza in the journal 
Deutschland, 1796. Speaking of the contradiction and the senseless-
ness of a direct intuition of the infinite absolute, Schlegel wrote about 
the futility of every philosophy that takes as its point of departure a 
single, fundamental, first principle. Recall the decisive passage from 
Schlegel's review of Jacobi's Woldemar: 
Die zweite Widersinnigkeit trifft eigentlich jede Elementarphi-
losophie, welche von einer Tatsache ausgeht. - Was Jacobi dafür 
anführt: "das jeder Erweis schon etwas Erwiesenes voraussetze" 
(Spin. S. 225); gilt nur wider diejenigen Denker, welche von einem 
einizgen Erweis ausgehen. Wie wenn nun aber ein von aussen unbe-
dingter, gegenseitig aber bedingter und bedingender Wechselerweis 
der Grund der Philosophie ware? (KFSA H, 72) 
Schlegel's Wechselerweis can therefore be led directly back to his read-
ing of Spinoza, through Jacobi's critique. On this point, consider what 
Frank asserts concerning the impact of Schlegel's review and critique 
of Jacobi. He writes: 
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Dass der hoechste Grundsatz der Philosophie nur ein 'Wechsel er-
weis' sein kann, soll hier einfach bedeuten, dass ein Begriff oder ein 
Satz nicht per se, sozusagen aus cartesianischer Evidenz, sondern 
erst durch einen weiteren und zweiten (vorläufig) begründet wird 
(für den dann dasselbe gilt, so dass wir durch Kohärenzbildung der 
Wahrheit immer nur näherkommen, ohne sie selbst in einem einzi-
gen Gedanken definitiv zu packen zu kriegen). Genau das war aber 
eine Grundeinsicht, die Jacobi in der Zweitauflage seines Spinoza-
Buchleins formuliert hatte. (Frank 1997, 929) 
Frank's epistemological reading thus frames the "alternating prin-
ciple" as merely a different type of grounding or principle, a relational 
grounding not through any form of direct or immediate evidence, but 
through another provisional (vorläufig) proposition, which itself in 
turn is grounded through another, ad infinitum. If Frank's reading 
were correct, Schlegel's alternating principle would be subject to pre-
cisely the same critique as Jacobi's critique of Fichte. It would appear 
naIve to assurne that Schlegel simply replaced Jacobi's charge of infi-
nite regression with his own version of continual grounding, even if it 
is qualified, as Frank does, with the term "provisional." In the passage 
cited above, Schlegel asserts that the Wechselerweis is unconditional 
and absolute (unbedingt) from the outside - meaning here that there 
is no other external principle or ground prior to it - but reciprocally 
determined and determining (gegenseitig bedingend). It can therefore 
not be a ground or grounded, even in a preliminary or provisional 
fashion, through a second, further concept or principle as Frank sug-
gests. Rather, to the extent that one must speak of alternation not as a 
"principle" but as a process, it must itself be unconditional- strict1y in 
the sense as not being caused by a prior principle or ground external to 
it - and it must also be unconditionally, i.e. absolutely inflected in its 
very core by the difference, resistance, or the opposition of the Other 
or Gegner as Schlegel figures it. 
Summing up Frank's suggestive reading, we can say the following: 
first, Schlegel's Wechselerweis or Wechselgrundsatz is understood as 
his (Schlegel's) attempt to provide an alternating, reciprocating, oscil-
lating movement between two principles that interact in an as yet inde-
terminate manner that ensures and guarantees the infinite progression 
and endless striving for truth that Frank believes to be Schlegel's ulti-
mate object. On this view, Schlegel's "alternating principle" becomes 
a "progressive[r] Reflexionserweis."(Frank 1997, 933) Secondly, this 
notion of alternation or oscillation was already present in Schlegel's 
self-proclaimed debut on the philosophical stage, his review of the 
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first four volumes of F.I. Niethammer's Philosophisches Journal of 
1795. There, Schlegel wrote of oscillation: "Zwar müssen alle übrigen 
Wissenschaften oszillieren, so lange es an einer positiven Philosophie 
fehlt. Indessen gibt es in ihnen doch wenigstens etwas relativ Festes 
und Allgemeingeltendes. In der Philosophie ist nichts ausgemacht, wie 
der Augenschein lehrt. Es fehlt hier noch aller Grund und Boden." 
(KFSA VIII, 30) Third, Frank then uses this reading to support his 
claim that Schlegel held a coherence-theory of truth in which truth is 
approached or approximated progressively as increasing corroborative 
evidence and coherence among various positions is achieved. Finally, 
fourth, in providing the actual content of the Wechselerweis, Frank 
does not use fragments from the period of 1796-97, but rather fast-
forwards to later fragments - for example the fragments contained 
in Geist der Fichtischen Wissenschaftlehre. <1797-1798> and to the 
lectures on transcendental philosophy - Transzendentalphilosophie -
that Schlegel delivered in Jena 1800-1801. 
Two interpretive hypotheses suggest themselves in light of Frank's 
genealogy: first, that Schlegel develops the "alternating principle" 
over time, that Wechselerweis experiences and responds to change as 
Schlegel reads the other post-Kantian idealisms of the period 1795-98 
(above all, Schelling); or, second, that alternation itself alternates or 
shifts according to the specific application or project at hand, that is, 
in response to the material-philological challenges Schlegel faced in 
these decisive years - most notably, the justification of modernity (in 
Über das Studium der griechischen Poesie [1795-1797]); the critique 
and historicization of Kantian aesthetics; the articulation of a herme-
neutic philology, a "philosophy of philology," in the notebooks Zur 
Philologie (1797); and the nascent glimpses of a theory of romantic 
poetry as a "progressive Universalpoesie" in Athenäumsfragment 116 
(1798). In either case, based on the evidence we have considered, it 
seems insufficient to incorporate or subsume Schlegel's "alternating 
principle" within the transcendental-philosophical paradigm. 
Frank's interpretation of the "alternating principle" evidences a 
c1ear commitment to idealistic philosophy and to the philosophy of 
the subject, and this needs to be made explicit. To conceive of the 
"alternating principle" as a "consortium" of two or more principles 
envelops alternation within a speculative architecture, here instanced 
in the epistemological approximation (Annäherung) of truth. This is 
certainly one plausible way of reading the Wechselerweis. However, 
such a reading forecloses the possibility of exploring where Schlegel 
truly departs from the idealistic framework and begins to articulate 
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the rudiments of what I would refer to as a material hermeneutics. 
Relative, tentative, or preliminary (Frank uses the term vorläufig) self-
identity locates the process of alternation on a progressive, speculative 
continuum. To do justice to Frank's strong reading, he does indicate 
the opening or aperture toward such an alternative reading in his 
artic1e '''Alle Wahrheit ist relativ, Alles wissen symbolisch"'. (Frank 
1996a) There, he states: "Es wird also, wie Schlegel sagt, 'ein abso-
lutes Verstehen [ ... ] geleugnet in der Philosophie, die eine absolute 
Wahrheit leugnet" (KFSA XII, 102, Nr. 257). Von hier öffnen sich 
mannigfache Wege in eine Hermeneutik der Endlichkeit, die ich hier 
nicht werde beschreiben können." (Frank 1996a, 431) Frank never 
followed-up on this highly promising and suggestive thesis of a herme-
neutics of finitude, in my view so at odds with his own reading, nor 
does he mention the other decisive passage of Schlegel's concerning 
precisely this issue on the same page: "Ein absolutes Verstehen ist 
nach unserer Absicht gar nicht möglich. Es schreibt sich dies aus dem 
Dogmatismus her." (KFSA XII, 102, Nr. 254) If indeed no absolute 
understanding is possible on Schlegel's view, then it follows that there 
can be no absolute truth, even in the speculative sense, either. Rather 
than trying to encompass this proposition in a speculative fashion at 
a higher level of philosophical reflection, Schlegel's imperative states 
that philosophy itself must be complemented by and through other 
disciplines, namely history and philology, through which and in rela-
tion to which alone it can then understand itself as "relative" and 
truly "historical." On Frank's view, Schlegel's "alternating principle" 
remains for him a subject of pure theoretical philosophy, uninflected by 
the difficulty and contingency of interpretation and communication 
that beset such a hermeneutics of finitude or material philology. As a 
replacement or "proxy" for the first, absolute principle, the Wechseler-
weis in Frank's reading gains him the infinite progressivity of knowl-
edge and the coherence theory of truth, but at the cost of the practical 
hermeneutic dimensions of interpretive resistance and incomprehensi-
bility central to Schlegel's project. It is telling that Frank's reading of 
the content of the Wechselerweis relies on a quote that posits a c1ear 
duality in reciprocal, equal oscillation/alternation, parity of opposing, 
thetic principles, and that this strict economy resides sole1y at the level 
of subjectivity: "Das Ich setzt sich selbst und das Ich soll sich setzen." 
While Frank develops his thesis concerning Schlegel's Wechselerweis 
as the direct antipode to Fichte, it is remarkable the degree to which 
Frank's own reading of the alternating principle mirrors Fichte's 
argumentation concerning Wechselwirkung and Wechselbestimmung 
Transcendental or Material Oscillation? 113 
in the Wissenschaftslehre of 1794: both situate alternation within the 
theoretical sphere of subjectivity and the philosophy of the subject. 
(Fichte SW I, 130-131, 140-141, 153) Frank's reading therefore fixes 
the alternating process within the immanent domain of the subject, 
and thereby bypasses or circumvents Schlegel's quite pronounced 
proliferation or multiplication of Wechselerweise, one could say its 
self-displacement (Selbstversetzung), on at least two additional levels: 
what we might refer to as the disciplinary level and secondly, within 
the area of practical philosophy, at the moral-politicallevel. The latter 
is the focus of Guido Naschert's reading of Schlegel's "alternating 
principle." 
III. Naschert's Transcendental-Pragmatic 
Reading of Schlegel's Wechselerweis 
Guido Naschert has extended the scholarship concerning Schle-
gel's "alternating principle" in aseries of articles that appeared in 
Athenäum. Jahrbuch für Romantik in 1996-1997. Similar to Behler 
and Frank, Schlegel's confrontation with Jacobi's Spinoza book and 
Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre in 1796 play central roles in Naschert's 
reading ofthe "alternating principle," yet Naschert takes the con-
Bict, indeed, the apparent chasm between philosophy and his tory as 
his point of departure. Schlegel's critique of Fichte is, quite simply, 
that Fichte denies history, and even the Wissenschaftslehre requires, 
on Schlegel's view, historical material and historical spirit from the 
very outset. 15 Naschert also sees the "alternating principle" as a stark 
contrast and alternative to the Fichtean model of a philosophy from 
a first principle. (Naschert 1996, 48) Naschert argues that Schlegel's 
Wechselerweis emerges out of an immanent critique of Fichte's sys-
tem and seeks to show " ... wie dies zu einer neuen Konzeption von 
Transzendentalphilosophie geführt hat, deren wichtigste Rechtfer-
tigungsstrategie transzendentalpragmatischer Natur ist." (Naschert 
1996,49) Naschert's reading differs decidedly from Frank's in that 
15 Schlegel writes that Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre cannot do without "historischen 
Geist und historischen Stoff [ ... ] gleich beim ersten Schritt." KFSA XVIII, 520, 
20. Naschert 1996, 81 reads Schlegel as the first German philosopher for whom 
the problem of the historical progression of the system is a real problem, thus 
anticipating Hegel: "das prinzipielle Problem einer sich für den geschichtlichen 
Fortschritt offenhaltenden Systembildung." 
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Naschert emphasizes the practical aspect of the "alternating prin-
ciple," its emergence as an ethical resolution of the dichotomy of 
freedom and nature, over and against Frank's more purely theoretical 
view. Let us examine how Naschert's transcendental-pragmatic argu-
ment concerning Schlegel's "alternating principle" runs in detail. 
Naschert begins by laying bare the "Hegelian" prejudice underlying 
much of Schlegel scholarship and interpretation, ranging from Hegel 
himself to Benjamin to Winfried Menninghaus, (Menninghaus 1987, 
57) that Schlegel essentially realized and developed further Fichte's 
philosophy in the arena of aesthetics. In addition, like Behler and 
Frank, Naschert identifies 1796 and Schlegel's arrival in Jena as the 
decisive turning point, his disillusionment with Fichte's philosophy, 
and at the same time his reading of Fichte's Naturrecht (1796) and the 
Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo (1796), with their increased emphasis 
on the intersubjective and open concept of the "I" in opposition to 
the purely subjective and "enclosed" concept in the earlier versions 
of the Wissenschaftslehre. (Naschert 1996, 54-56) Naschert adduces 
three important pieces of evidence to support his claim: first, in 
Schlegel's discussion of Niethammer's Philosophisches Journal in the 
Allegemeine Literatur Zeitung of 21-22 March, 1797;16 secondly, in 
Schlegel's critique of Jacobi's Woldemar, in which the complete lack 
of a reciprocal relation with Allwine, and the isolative egoism and 
self-obsession of Woldemar leads Schlegel to conclude the absence of 
Wechselbegeisterung or "reciprocal enthusiasm." (KFSA II, 63; Lauth 
1971, 165-197) This relationality within the practical sphere - that of 
volition, of moral obligation, and of right - Naschert interprets as a 
"transcendental-pragmatic turn" (transzendental pragmatische Wende) 
in Schlegel's writing. (Naschert 1996, 56) What is this transcendental-
pragmatic turn? Wherein does it consist, precisely, and how does it 
function according to Naschert? 
In Naschert's view, Schlegel's critique of Jacobi in his review of 
Woldemar centers on what Schlegel refers to as the essential moments 
of philosophical engagement - truth and scientificity17 - both of 
which he finds totally absent in Jacobi's philosophy. These are, for 
16 Naschert 1996, 56: "dass es sich beim Wechsel grund um einen notwendigen Wider-
streit im Selbstverhältnis handelt, der sich mit den Begriffen des Wo liens, Sollens, 
und Könnens formulieren lässt." 
17 KFSA II, 71: "Aber nur wenn Streben nach Wahrheit und Wissenschaft die Seele 
dieses Lebens ist, kann der Geist desselben philosophisch genannt werden." 
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Schlegel, according to Naschert, "constitutionallaws of philosophy,"18 
constitutional "rules of philosophy" (Naschert 1996, 63-64) which are 
necessarily implied in every action. The refiection upon such impli-
cature and constitutive laws of action to which we subject ourselves 
in each and every individual action creates, in Naschert's view, the 
"transcendental-pragmatic" argumentation al strategy that Schlegel 
employs against his opponent Jacobi. Here, it is important to note that 
Naschert does not confine such refiection on the constitutive laws to 
self-consciousness, but rather views these as binding universal condi-
tions of philosophizing. In a word, against Jacobi's infinite regression, 
Schlegel posits a relational, even circular process of positing - Wech-
se/erweis. More precisely, Schlegel displaces the unconditional, foun-
dational principle into a reciprocating, oscillating structure which can 
be identified as the act of philosophy itself. (Naschert 1996, 62) This 
represents nothing short of a transformation of the Fichtean Tathand-
lung into a practical-ethical decision, a pragmatic, thetic positioning 
that is, from the very start, a fully relational, alternating principle, one 
which dispenses with the idea of an "unconditional beginning" and 
the pure immediacy of the Fichtean intuition. (Naschert 1996, 67) 
Fichte's point of departure, the "intellectual intuition," is therefore 
for Schlegel incomplete, mystical, and egotistical, at odds with Fichte's 
own demand of an absolute science that would encompass alt of real-
ity. Naschert then traces Schlegel's reception of Fichte's Grundlagen 
des Naturrechts of 1795, where Fichte emphasizes that the return of 
the "I" into itself introduces a displacement that necessarily leads to 
the problem of intersubjectivity. For Fichte, the very idea of justice in 
the Naturrecht presupposes other subjectivities, other acting subjects 
that interact and relate, limiting the (original) subject and self-limit-
ing through the relation with the original subject. Fichte's "answer" 
to the problem of intersubjectivity is therefore "reciprocal relation" 
(Wechselwirkung): "Nur freie Wechselwirkung durch Begriffe und 
nach Begriffen, nur Geben und Empfangen von Erkenntnissen, ist der 
eigenthümliche Charakter der Menschheit." (Fichte SW III, 40) This 
response was inadequate, on Schlegel's view, as it located the reciproc-
ity and relationality solely in the sphere of concepts, in the "reciprocal 
relation of concepts and according to concepts," in the "giving and 
receiving of knowledges," in a word: as a purely speculative and theo-
18 KFSA 11, 71: " [ ... ] die konstitutionellen Gesetze, denen sich jeder Denker durch 
die Tat (wie der Bürger durch den Eintritt in den Staat) unterwirft und unterwerfen 
muß." 
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retical function. For Naschert, the fundamental difficulty of Fichte's 
framing of reciprocity was for Schlegel the historical progression of 
actual open-ended applicability (Anwendbarkeit) and communicability 
(Mitteilbarkeit), (KFSA XVIII, 520, 21; Naschert 1996, 77) - regula-
tive functions missing in Fichte's notion of Wechselwirkung. It is all 
the more surprising that Naschert coneludes by reincorporating Schle-
gel's "alternating principle" into a transcendental philosophy of con-
sciousness that erases Schlegel's insistence on the material process of 
application and the resistances and displacements of communicativ-
ity when he states: "Der Wechselerweis scheint daher ein unbedingtes 
Verhältnis zwischen einem bedingten Sollen und einem bedingten 
Wollen zu begründen [ ... ] das als Grundstruktur des Bewußtseins 
anzunehmen ist." (Naschert 1996, 83) By relocating this relationality 
in the realm of mind and subjectivity - as a "fundamental structure 
of consciousness" as he puts it - Naschert in my view hirnself returns, 
perhaps unwittingly, to the "Hegelian" prejudice of Friedrich Schlegel 
scholarship which he traced and criticized at the outset of his essay. 
Given this interpretation of Schlegel's "alternating principle," it is 
easy to understand how Naschert sees a "transcendental-pragmatic 
turn," (Naschert 1996, 56) a "transcendental-pragmatic strategy of 
justification,"(Naschert 1996, 49) a single, unifying pattern of expla-
nation ("ein einheitliches Erklärungsmuster"), (Naschert 1997, 34) a 
single, unitary center of argumentation ("ein einheitliches Zentrum der 
Argumentationsbewegung") (Naschert 1997, 34) in Schlegel's attempt 
to overcome Fichte's project to ground philosophy in the originary 
activity of the "I," or even the reciprocally oscillating relation between 
the land the Other, as Fichte did in his Grundlage des Naturrechts of 
1796. Naschert's decisive contribution was to shift the emphasis from 
the theoretical to the practical domain; and yet his reading seems to 
be haunted by a Kantian hermeneutic that subsurnes the multiplicity 
and dispersion of alternation under a single, unifying, transcendental 
principle or set of principles. 
In the second installment of this extended essay, Naschert comes 
extremely elose to a self-critique that would enable us to separate 
Schlegel's "alternating principle" from its transcendental-idealistic 
characterization as a fundamental structure of consciousness. In 
this second piece, Naschert writes of a "de-transcendentalization" of 
Fichte's Wissenschafts lehre that points in a psychological and herme-
neutical direction ("die in eine psychologische und interpretation-
sphilosophische Richtung weist.") (Na schert 1997, 31) In my view, 
Naschert has this part exactly right. This reading also dovetails nicely 
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with Frank's slight indication towards a "hermeneutics of finitude" 
discussed previously. (Frank 1996a, 431) The question is: how does 
one reconcile the anti-transcendental, historical gesture Schlegel intro-
duces with respect to Fichte's philosophy with Naschert's claim of 
a fundamental transcendental-pragmatic turn, Schlegel's attempt, in 
Naschert's words, "die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit menschlichen 
Wissens ohne letzte Fundamente zu bedenken"? (Naschert 1997, 31) 
This would seem paradoxical at the very least, considering that any 
attempt to formulate "necessary conditions of human knowledge" 
seems to entail a form of ahistorical foundationalism. (Rorty 1979) 
N aschert fully recognizes the alternation between logic and history 
present in Schlegel's polemic against Fichte, and Schlegel's insertion 
of communicability as a relational principle. However, he resolutely 
locates these important elements of Schlegel's critique in the most 
fundamental alternation between objectivity, subjectivity and inter-
subjectivity. (Naschert 1997, 13) As Naschert writes: 
[ ... ] die Antinomie des praktischen Selbstverhältnisses und das mit 
ihr in Zusammenhang stehende Modell einer Wechselbestimmung 
zwischen praktischem und empirischem Ich als Deutung des 'Wech-
selgrundes und 'Wechselerweises' ein einheitliches Erklärungsmuster 
anzubieten [ ... ] (Naschert 1997, 34) 
One wonders whether N aschert's desire to provide such a unifying 
explanation for Schlegel's disparate and diverse expressions of the 
"alternating principle" did not itself lead to his conclusion of a tran-
scendental-pragmatic justification as a fundamental structure of con-
sciousness; whether in fact the reading of the "alternating principle" 
under the interpretive aegis of transcendental pragmatics results from 
the frustratingly multiple, even disparate determinations of alterna-
tion, or Schlegel's alternating interpretive movements themselves. On 
this view, Naschert's interpretation would represent itself a type of 
Kantian hermeneutic, an attempt to subsume the heterogeneity, multi-
plicity, and disparities of Schlegel's writing under a unifying principle. 
Yet Naschert's excellent essays in fact wonderfully display the sub-
liminal tension between, on the one hand, the transcendental and, on 
the other, the contingent and material tendendes of Schlegel's writing 
that mirrors Schlegel's own ambivalence with regard to philosophy 
as a fundamental science or Grundwissenschaft. However, instead of 
maintaining that ambivalence and upholding the tension between these 
two conflicting modalities and claims, Naschert in my view succumbs 
to the transcendental resolution by transforming alternation into a 
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quasi-transcendental-practical principle that constitutes an absolute, 
unconditional and indubitable condition for human action. In this 
way, the essays violate Schlegel's "alternating principles," which in 
my view seek to preserve and even heighten the tension between phi-
losophy and philology, logic and history, theory and interpretation. 
Schlegel's alternations attenuate this opposition or tension precisely 
by thematizing the oscillating and fluctuating movement itself over and 
against the finality and fixity of "absolute conditions" and the flight 
into foundational structures of consciousness. 
For Naschert, Schlegel does not and cannot escape the transcen-
dental scheme of argumentation and the attempt at a philosophical 
grounding (Grundlegung), even if this Grund defies the absolute first 
principle of the Fichtean postulate: "Das Ringen nach einer philoso-
phischen Grundlegung gilt daher zugleich der Auswirkung einer neuen 
philosophischen Kunstsprache, die den transzendentalen Bedingungen 
von Welt, Bewußtsein und Gemeinschaft angemessen ist." (Naschert 
1997, 15) Schlegel's language/rhetoric becomes the project of an 
"Ausarbeitung einer transzendentalphilosophische Kunstprosa,"( 15) 
and the imperative to reciprocally communicate oneself communicat-
ing becomes a "transzendentale Einsicht in die Unhintergehbarkeit 
des Symphilosophierens selbst," (30) so that what was essentially a 
rhetorical, performative action in Schlegel's fragments becomes a 
constative "insight," a transcendental statement of the "conditions of 
possibility" in the Kantian sense. Yet the incisive point was, as Schle-
gel stated it, referring to the transcendental strategy, much more a 
matter of construction than deduction: "Construction ist weit mehr 
als Deduktion." (KFSA XVIII, 36, Nr. 185) If one is going to pos-
tulate science, "und sucht nur die Bedingung ihrer Möglichkeit, so 
geräth man in den Mysticism und d.[ie] konsequenteste von diesem 
Standpunkt einzig mögliche Auflösung d.[er] Aufgabe ist - das Set-
zen eines absoluten Ich - wodurch Form und Inhalt d.[er] absoluten 
Wissenschaftsl[ehre] zugleich gegeben wird." (KFSA XVIII, 7, Nr. 32) 
In other words, if you are going to play the transcendental deduc-
tion game, the Fichtean resolution, with its deduction of the absolute 
original positing of the "I", is, according to Schlegel, the most con-
sistent, indeed, the most coherent way to play. But Schlegel's critical 
point is that the very idea of the transcendental deduction is insuf-
ficient, ahistorical, and severely limited with regard to both the scope 
and depth of philosophy. The decisive issue here is that Schlegel does 
not, as Naschert avers, pI ace the reciprocal determination between 
practical and empirical "I" as a single, indivisible act, "dessen Ex-
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plikation als 'Wechselerweis' die Grundlehre fundiert."(Naschert 
1997,26) Rather, Schlegel deliberately places this "one indivisible act" 
in a field or network of opposing, even potentially inimical acts or the 
counter-moves of the Other or "opponent" (Gegner), whose resistance 
and delimitation is required for the actual alternating relation between 
the practical and the empirical, finite subject. In other words, not from 
within the subject, not from the immanent sphere of consciousness, 
but rather through a radical exteriority, that is, from without, through 
actual, material "wechseitiges Widerstreiten," (Na schert 1997, 16) the 
real concrete alternation or oscillation with and through the Other 
- as other person, disciplines, or historical difference - indicates an 
irresolvable tension between "pure" (transcendental) philosophy, 
hermeneutics (as the "alternation" between grammar, criticism, and 
interpretation), and rhetoric, which in this case might be understood 
as the practical thetic positioning or performative entwined within the 
alternating principles. Returning, then, to Schlegel's insistence on "[ ... ] 
die konstitutionellen Gesetze, denen sich jeder Denker durch die Tat 
(wie der Bürger durch den Eintritt in den Statt) unterwirft und unter-
werfen muß [ ... ]" (KFSA II, 71) in his critique of Jacobi's Woldemar, 
the paradoxical situation arises within which such "constitutive laws" 
can only be constituted as such precisely through aseries 01 alterna-
tions, for example between the philosopher's striving for truth and the 
limits of reason, or the individual will and the laws of the state. 
IV. Schlegel's Critique of Fichte and the 
MateriaP9 Hermeneutical-Philological Reading 
of Schlegel's Alternating Principles 
"Gewaltig insistirt auf MATERIALE Philologie." 
(KFSA XVI 54, 222)2° 
1795-97 was aperiod of intense philosophical and philological study 
for Schlegel, working on and through a number of significant herme-
19 I use the term "material hermeneutics" in the sense in which it was used by Peter 
Szondi to oppose the notion of philosophical hermeneutics. See Szondi I975, espe-
cially p. 404. On Szondi's conception of a "material hermeneutics," see: Altenhofer 
I979, I65-2II, Bollack I990, 370-39°, and Rastier I998, I902-I9I5. 
20 On Schlegel's project of a material hermeneutics, see his notebooks Zur Philologie 
I und [Iin KFSA XVI: KFSA XVI 42, #94 and #95; 45, #I3I; 6o-6r. 
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neutic-phi1010gica1, philosophical and literary-aesthetic issues, many 
of which have been thoughtfully examined by existing scholarship 
in this area:21 the relationship between the three aspects or compo-
nents of philology; the process of Anwendung no longer considered 
as the tradition al applicatio, but as a complex reflective process of 
appropriation, reception, and integration; the hermeneutic effects or 
consequences of a distinct structure of modernity, a culture which, for 
Schlegel, revolves around and is obsessed with subjectivity and that 
which is interesting;22 and finally, the precarious hermeneutic situation 
of ongoing, cyclical reading and study continually folding back on 
itself and examining its own preconditions. In my view, it is impossible 
that these difficulties or problems do not play equally in the entire 
discourse of alternation and oscillation, in the statements regarding 
an alternating principle emerging at this time. To set them apart can 
only be the result of a disciplinary or philosophical bias. The entire 
thrust of Schlegel's proposed Philosophy of Philology was precisely 
to problematize and break down the sharp disciplinary boundaries 
separating philosophy and philology, philosophy and history, critique 
and interpretation, logic and history, rhetoric and philosophy, and 
to forge a new articulation of the manifold relations between these 
disciplines.23 
In the following, my aim is not to present a complete reading of 
Schlegel's "alternating principles," but merely to gesture toward the 
form such a reading might take once we have extended the horizon of 
interpretation beyond a transcendental argument. Such .an argument 
identifies and places the Wechselerweis within a "fundamental struc-
ture of consciousness" (Naschert), or "the reflective and self-critical 
mobility of the mind." (Be hIer) It is a matter of the structure and 
function of the Wechselerweis, what role it assurnes in Schlegel's early 
21 See, above all, Dierkes 1980; Michel 1982; Schlaffer 1990; Zovko 1990; Beh1er 1992; 
Leventha1 1994 and Beiser 2003. 
22 KFSA 1,208: "Sie [die moderne Poesie, RL] macht nicht einmal Ansprüche auf 
Objektivität, welches doch die erste Bedingung des reinen und unbedingten ästhe-
tischen Werts ist, und ihr Ideal ist das Interessante, d.h. subjective ästhetische 
Kraft." See also: Ostermann, 197~215. 
23 On the rhetoric of re1ationa1ity and the re1ationality of rhetoric, see Schnyder 
1999, whose argument aims at precise1y the p1acing-into-re1ation of poetics and 
rhetoric, and rhetoric and phi10sophy as the centra1 rhetorica1 process of romantic 
poetry. The rhetoric of "In-Berührung-setzen" articu1ated by Schnyder actually 
corresponds to my reading of Wechselerweis at a number of points, and Schnyder 
does not fall prey to the idealistic-transcendenta1 temptation. 
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philosophy, once we have dispensed with the idealist interpretation 
that reduces and subjugates alternation to the immanence of the sub-
ject, the closure of unity and identity, and a coherence theory of truth, 
even if such a theory is suggested in terms of an ongoing, progressive 
approximation (Annäherung) (Frank). In the reading I will off er, oscil-
lation or fluctuation at the level of consciousness, at the level of mind 
or the subject, is merely one, and in fact very limited form of alter-
nation, one which itself exists in alternation with practical (ethical, 
moral, political), aesthetic, and historical correctives or resistances 
that in turn fuel the conversations between disciplines of the type that 
Schlegel sought to incite. 
Schlegel's critique of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre began almost 
immediately after his arrival in Jena in August of 1796. In a letter 
to Körner of 9 August 1796, Schlegel stated his dismay of Fichte's 
response to a query of the pi ace of his tory in his system, and was 
already acutely aware of the ahistorical, indeed anti-historical ten-
dency of Fichte's philosophy. (KFSA XXIII, 333) The critique of 
Fichte's anti-historical attitude remained determinant for Schlegel's 
entire reception of Fichtean philosophy. Fichte's system remains pre-
cisely only a "tendency" without actually being carried out, accord-
ing to Schlegel, due to the absence or lack of a sense of history. For 
Schlegel, Fichte's system is the true transcendental philosophy, but 
not yet the absolute or systematic philosophy in that it has not yet 
comprehended history, it has not historicized itself, historicized its 
own thetic postulate. Philosophy can only become truly systematic 
and absolute, according to Schlegel's critique, as it historicizes itself 
and criiicizes its own historical emergence and development: "Sobald 
die cpO" [Philosophie] Wiss[enschaft] wird, giebts Hist[orie]. Alles 
O"UO"T [System(atische)] ist Hist[orisch]. .. " (KFSA XVIII, 85, Nr, 671) 
A true philosophical system has more in common, Schlegel wrote, 
with a poetical and historical system than with a mathematical one. 
Schlegel's first significant departure from Fichte's Wissenschafts lehre 
is therefore the historicization of philosophy, the appropriation of 
history for philosophy and the intereference of the historical in and 
for the system of philosophy.24 
The second aspect of Schlegel's critique of Fichte's Wissenschafts-
lehre centers on the issue of communicability (Mitteilbarkeit), a fun-
24 Here, Schlegel draws on and extends the eighteenth century tradition of the history 
of philosophy that has been documented in Israel 2006, 471-495. 
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damen tal concept that Schlegel appropriates and transforms from 
Kant's Critique of Judgment. 25 The famous fragment from the Geist 
der Fichteschen Wissenschaftslehre 1797-1798 reads: "F.[ichte] sagt 
d[en] Leuten immer Bücherlang, daß er eigentlich nicht mit ihnen 
reden wolle noch könne." (KFSA XVIII, 37, Nr. 200) The mysticism 
of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre resides precisely in its absolute positing 
as a pure action that remains incommunicable to the extent that every 
expression must always presuppose it, and that therefore no expres-
sion can adequately grasp it. Thus, Schlegel writes in the supplements 
to the Philosophische Fragmente of 1796: "Der konsequente Mystiker 
muß die Mitteilbarkeit ALLES Wissens nicht bloß dahin gestellt seyn 
lassen: sondern geradezu läugnen. Der Eklektiker muß sie behaupten, 
wenn er gegen den Mystiker einigen Schein von Recht haben will <und 
wenn s[ein] Kriterium philosophische Gültigkeit haben soll.>"( KFSA 
XVIII, 517, Nr. 4) Philosophical activity and communicability, not in 
the sense of thetic stating, but rather in the sense of actually sharing 
in a material with someone,26 go hand in hand according to Schlegel; if 
you can't communicate it, it isn't philosophy. Fichte's system remains 
occult and inaccessible insofar as the original thetic positing remains 
outside of all actual and possible expression according to Schlegel. 
The fundamental proposition, Fichte advises the reader repeatedly in 
the Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschafts lehre of 1794, is an action that 
must be perfomed, and ultimately grasped by each individual in the 
sense of an originary, immediate insight. (Henrich 1982, 15-52) The 
discursive representations of the basic Grundsatz 1=1 are not identical 
to the primordial, originary insight into this fundamental identity. 
Fichte's "incomprehensibility" is the inability to discursively commu-
nicate the absolute positing that underlies and makes possible all other 
(discursive) determinations. The paradox might be formulated thus: 
Fichte's Grundsatz - the original self-positing of the "I", the primor-
dial Tathandlung as the condition of the possibility of all positing - is 
nevertheless stated, discursively articulated as a proposition and as the 
cornerstone of Fichte's system in the Wissenschaftslehre. 
Before mapping the connection of this critique to Schlegel's formu-
lation of the "alternating principle," a review of the textual basis for 
the "alternating principle" as it emerges in the period between 1795 
25 Following the lead of Graubner 1977, 53-75, I analyzed this in relation to F. Schle-
gel in my Disciplines 0/ Interpretation (1994),262-264,279. 
26 KFSA 11, 158: "[ ... ] man muß es wirklich mitteilen, mit ihm teilen können, nicht 
bloß sich äussern, allein [ ... ]" 
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and 1797 would be useful. We have referred above to Schlege1's review 
of Jacobi where Wechselerweis appears for the first time. (KFSA II, 
72) In the Philosophische Fragmente. Erste Epoche. Zur Wissenschafts-
lehre of I796, Schlegel noted: "Die er [Philosophie] <im eigentlichen 
Sinne> hat weder einen Grundsatz noch einen Gegenstand, noch 
eine bestimmte Aufgabe. Die Wissenschaftlehre hat eine bestimmte 
Aufgabe (Ich und NichtIch und deren Verhaeltnis) einen bestimmten 
Wechselgrund und also auch eine bestimmte Aufgabe." (KFSA XVIII, 
7, Nr. 36) In the fragments under the title Der Geist der Wissenschaft-
slehre I797-I798, Schlegel wrote: "Das Ich setzt sich selbst und das 
Ich soll sich setzen sind wohl mit nichten abgeleitete Saetze aus einem 
höheren; einer ist so hoch als der andere; auch sind es zwei Grundsä-
tze, nicht einer. Wechselgrundsatz." (KFSA XVIII, 36, Nr. 193) Most 
importantly for our purposes, consider the following longer passages 
from the Philosophische Fragmente of 1796, which I quote in full so 
as to preserve the scriptural context within which Schlegel enunciates 
the term "alternating principles": 
Wenn ich mich in diesen Blättern so oft auf die Bestätigung der 
Erfahrung berufe: so räsonnire ich nicht bloß philosophisch, sondern 
logisch. Die Logik und Historie sind abgeleitete Wissenschaften 
eines Stammes. Zwischen ihnen findet also Bestätigung - Wechseler-
weis statt. Sie dürfen Lehrsätze von einander borgen. - Bestimmung 
aller Wissenschaften, wo dieß erlaubt ist. - In der Wissenschaftslehre 
giebt es EINEN Wechselerweis, weil das Ganze ein in sich vollen-
deter Kreislauf ist; in den abgeleiteten Wissenschaften Vielheit der 
Wechselerweise; und im System Allheit der Wechselerweise. (KFSA 
XVIII, 505, Nr. 2) 
The logical implicature of alternation entails that the two moments 
of philosophy -logic and history - confirm (bestätigen) each other; as 
Schlegel contends, they may even borrow (borgen) their propositions 
or theorems from each other. Such an alternating determination or 
confirrnation occurs in the singular at the level of Fichte's Wissen-
schaftslehre, as a multiplicity in the sub-disciplines, and, in a specula-
tive sense (which Schlegel does not elucidate), as the totaUty of all 
alternating principles (of the subject itself, at the level of intersubjec-
tivity, within disciplines and among sub-disciplines, and then between 
the sciences themselves). 
Es muß der Philosophie nicht bloß ein Wechselbeweis, sondern auch 
ein Wechselbegriff zum Grunde liegen. Man kann bei jedem Begriff 
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wie bei jedem Erweis wieder nach einem Begriff und Erweis dessel-
ben fragen. Daher muß die Philosophie wie das epische Gedicht in 
der Mitte anfangen, und es ist unmöglich dieselbe so vorzutragen 
und Stück fuer Stück hinzuzählen, dass gleich das Erste für sich voll-
kommen begründet und erklärt waere. (KFSA XVIII, 518, Nr. 16) 
Circumventing Jacobi's critique, Schlegel avoids the infinite regres-
sion by placing the alternation itself in the middle, the mid-point or 
Indif[erenzpunkt between two or more propositions whose singularity 
and identity, qua individual propositions, cannot be understood as 
grounded or explained in and of themselves, but only in their alternat-
ing mediation with the Other. 
Nicht das Gebot: Wissenschaft soll sein - kann der Philosophie zum 
Grunde gelegt werden. Denn diese kann nur synthetisch aus dem: 
das Ich soll seyn - abgeleitet und also von dem Gegner in Anspruch 
genommen werden; nicht analytisch, aus dem was er nothwendig 
durch die That zugiebt, entwickelt werden. - Dies schlechthin ohne 
Ruecksicht auf den Gegner postuliren und den Gegner nicht wider-
legen, sondern ihm nur beweisen, dass er ein Sophist sey - ist noch 
nicht hinreichend. Es ist dann gewiss daß der Gegner Unrecht habe, 
aber nicht, daß der Philosoph Recht habe. In meinem System ist 
der letzte Grund wirklich ein Wechselerweis. (KFSA XVIII, 521, 
Nr. 22) 
The "final ground" - one cannot fail to sense Schlegel's nascent irony 
here - can only be alternation itself in its alternating alternation, i.e. 
not as Grund in the sense of a fundamental principle, proposition, 
or Grundsatz, but as the infinite relationality and oscillation that is 
enacted and determined in alternation itself. 
If we examine the fragments direct1y pertaining to the "alternating 
principle," it is immediately striking that there is an array of vari-
ous discursive formulations of the alternating process: Wechselerweis, 
Wechselgrund, Wechselbegriff, Wechselbeweis to mention just a few 
iterations of the "alternating principle." The iterative proliferation of 
alternating designations enacts on a discursive plane the alternating 
movement or oscillation of alternation itself, and begins to question 
the singularity and integrity of the phrase "alternating principle" 
itself. Specifically, in Beilage to the Philosophical Fragmente of 1796 
quoted above (KFSA XVIII, 505, Nr. 2), Schlegel speaks directly to 
the different levels of Wechselerweise (plural) and to the multiplicity 
of different alternating principles in the various "derivative" or indi-
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vidual sciences. Should we not take Schlegel to mean that there is not 
one, but infinitely many alternatingprinciples? Would not actual alter-
nation require such continuous and multiple alternation, not merely 
at the immanent level of subjectivity but also between the disciplines 
- philosophy and philology, logic and history - as weIl as between the 
sub-disciplines of these disciplines - criticism and hermeneutics in the 
ca se of "philology", for instance? Schlegel seems to suggest exactly 
that when he states, in Zur Philologie: 
Diese beyden Arten der Philologie [Kritik und Hermeneutik, R.L.] 
sind also in Wechselwirkung. (KFSA XVI, 38, Nr. 44) 
My first thesis would therefore be: the idealistic readings we have 
considered thus far all have in common that they fix "alternation" 
within the immanent sphere of subjectivity, whereas Schlegel's alter-
nation seems to suggest simultaneous, multiple alternations not merely 
within the subject, but between subjects, and not merely within specific 
disciplines (philosophy, history, philology), but between those disci-
plines as weIl - philosophy, history, literature, rhetoric, hermeneutics, 
and philology.27 Schlegel's Versuch über den Republikanismus (Essay 
on Republicanism), for example, which emerges at exactly the time he 
is formulating the Wechselerweis, even suggests a third term for the 
political operation of alternation: "Gemeinschaft der Menschen soll 
sein, oder das Ich soll mitgeteilt werden." (KFSA VII, 15) The impera-
tive of community is inextricably tied to a communicative process. 
This moves decidedly beyond the dualistic sense of the "alternating 
principle" projected by Frank, and inserts a political dimension into 
the discourse of alternation indicated by Guido Naschert: in addition 
to Das Ich setzt sich und das ich soll sich setzen, the third term would 
be das ich soll sich mitteilen - or the I should communicate itself - an 
imperative Schlegel states often in his writings on literary discourse, 
and one which refers back to the crucial concept of communicativity 
(Mitteilbarkeit) as an interactive principle of differentiation. (Leven-
thaI 1994, 278-279) Indeed, it can be persuasively argued that this 
third component of the alternation - communication or communicabil-
ity - actually emerges as the mediating, relational force of the three 
propositions or thetic determinations, as supra-subjective and neces-
27 Thus Behler had it exactly right when he stated that Schlegel eschewed "disciplin-
ary (philosophy) and systematic (doctrine of knowledge) fixation." (BehIer 1996, 
398) 
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sarily interactive mediation or relation on which any positioning and 
volition actually turn. 
Secondly, Schlegel historicizes and temporalizes the "alternating 
principle" and thereby transforms it from a static principle or proposi-
tion into a process or procedure, not merely a Tathandlung in Fichte's 
sense, but as a differentiating process which also underscores its per-
formative or illocutionary force in opposition to any representational 
or purely thetic function it might serve. Yet Schlegel's critical move 
was not merely, as Werner Hamacher suggested, the temporalization 
of the Fichteanfundamental principle ("Verzeitlichung des Fichteschen 
Grundsatzes") (Hamacher 1980, II79), but rather the oscillating, 
material instantiation of the "alternating principle" itself as a his-
torico-temporal event, a type of mise-en-scene or staging of alterna-
tion. Alternation sets into motion and temporalizes, to be sure; more 
importantly, however, it places the Fichtean Grundsatz into a field 
of difference and thereby renders Fichte's fundamental self-positing 
contingent and relational. As Schlegel wrote, the unity of the I and 
the Not-I might be absolute in theology, but it is not yet science, and 
this unity is only apart of the science of knowledge: "Diese [Einheit, 
RL] ist aber eigen[tlich] keine eigene Wissenschaft, sondern nur ein 
Theil d[er] Wissenschaftslehre." (KFSA XVIII 6,22) Selfhood, what 
is a basic theoretical and ahistorical proposition for Fichte, becomes 
and can only be stated as a self-history or Selbstgeschichte for Schle-
gel: "Die Natur der Selbstgeschichte wäre wichtig für die Theorie 
der Historie." (KFSA XVIII, 27, 98) Such a history of the self or 
"self-history", according to Schlegel, would be decisive for the theory 
of history. Thus, the propositions "the 'I' posits itself" and the "I 
ought to posit itself" are historical, contingent, derivative rather than 
absolute for Schlegel, and the "alternating principle" is not simply the 
two principles in reciprocal relation to one another - a "consortium" 
according to Manfred Frank (Frank 1996b, 44) - but actual alterna-
tion as the anonymous, alternating process itself; Wechselgrundsatz 
means therefore not merely switching or alternating between two dis-
tinct principles, but the alternating principle itself as alternating, as 
relational and mobile as opposed to fixed and static. 
In accordance with what has been stated concerning a possible dis-
ciplinary bias of the idealistic and transcendental readings, it appears 
as if, within the framework of a transcendental interpretation of the 
"alternating principle," the entire problematics of the relation between 
Philosophy and its historicity, in a word, Philosophy and Philology, 
or Philosophy and the question of its (historical) interpretation, or 
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PhiIosophy and its own hermeneutic, has been sidestepped, i.e. that 
the disciplinary alternation precisely between the problem of histori-
cal interpretation and the search for truth cannot even come to the 
fore in the idealistic reading. (Oesterreich 2005, 10) This intercession 
of such a historicizing-temporalizing process of alternation in both 
disciplines, which must be read as a critique of Philosophy as an ahis-
torical Grundwissenscha/t, can be gleaned from the foHowing quote 
from Schlegel's Philosophical Fragments 1796--1797: 
K [Kritik] der qm [Philosophie] == cpA. [Philologie] der cpcr [Philoso-
phie], das ist Eins. - Da die cpcr [Philosophie] so vieles ja fast alles 
im Himmel und auf Erden kritisiert hat; so kann sie sichs ja wohl 
gefallen lassen, dass man sie auch einmal kritisiere. (KFSA XVIII, 
41, Nr. 228) 
This passage dates from 1797 when the notebooks Zur Philologie were 
written. It constructs a discursive bridge between the philosophical 
discourse of "alternation" of 1796 and its necessary extension into 
philology and therefore history. Two processes are occurring simulta-
neously at the moment of these phiIological fragments. First, as Behler 
pointed out and as we know from the letter Schlegel wrote to Niet-
hammer, he had read three importanrt Fichtean texts of 1794-1795 
(On the Concept 0/ the Science 0/ Knowledge [1794]; The Foundation 
0/ the Entire Science 0/ Knowledge [1794-1795]; and the Outline 0/ the 
Distinctive Character 0/ the Science 0/ Knowledge [1795])28 and was 
now, on the one hand, trying to incorporate Fichte into his study of 
cIassical philology, as weH as beginning to formulate his critique of 
Fichte and work out his own philosophy. At the very least, we may 
hypothesize a clinamen here with respect to Fichte, Schlegel attempting 
to distinguish hirnself from Fichte, and the expression of an extremely 
ambivalent and conflicted relation to Fichte's philosophy. (Naschert 
1996, 47-49) This leads one to conjecture that it is precisely in the 
confrontation between the two disciplines, precisely in the attempt 
to work out the relation between Philology and Philosophy, that the 
alternating principle becomes areal issue for Schlegel. For Schlegel's 
critique of Philosophy prescribes, as he states, what is essentiaHy a phi-
lology 0/ philosophy: "X [Kritik] der cpn [Philosophie] = cp,,- [Philologie] 
28 Letter to Niethammer of 29 November 1795 KFSA XXIII, 258, where Schlegel 
proposes a review of three of the essential Fichtean writings and mentioned them 
by title. 
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der </m [Philosophie], das ist Eins." (KFSA XVIII, 40, 228; Leventhal 
1994,282-283; Bowie 1996, 116-135; Bowie 1997,53-55) 
Any account of the alternating principle would therefore have to 
begin by examining the difficult relation between the philological-
historical and the philosophical at this point in Schlegel's critical 
appropriation of idealist philosophy. If a critique of philosophy as a 
philology of philosophy intervenes in the self-determination of phi-
losophy, and the philologist is, in Schlegel's words, "ein historisches 
Subjekt,"( KFSA XVI, 49, Nr. 165) - philology itself having to do 
with conditional knowledge: "<pA [Philologie] ist Interesse fuer be-
dingtes Wissen." (KFSA XVI 46,137) - the ground has been prepared 
for a material hermeneutics. We would thus have to answer Schlegel's 
question, in 1797, "<Ist alles bedingte Wissen - <pA[philologisch] und 
historisch?>"(KFSA XVI, 46, 137) in the affirmative. At this time, 
Schlegel was at the crossroads, so to speak, intersecting two disci-
plines and seeking to articulate a set of questions that would bring 
the disciplines into discussion with one another without resigning or 
relegating one to the other. The decisive shift in Schlegel's discourse 
1796-97 was to maintain the tension between the two tendencies. The 
transcendental itself must be historicized as a method of excavating 
the historical conditions of the possibility of any form of science. 
Once the transcendental strategy has been historicized, it can then 
become another tool in the interpretive apparatus while at the same 
time an object of ongoing criticism itself. 
In sum, I would urge a corrective to what has been in my view 
an overly idealistic identification and transcendental reading (Behier 
and Frank), or "transcendental pragmatic" interpretation (Naschert) 
of Schlegel's "alternating principle" (Wechselerweis) in the period 
1796-1797. First and foremost, alternation must be pluralized, made 
manifold and variegated, so that we speak with Schlegel of "alternat-
ing principles" instead of the one master alternating "principle." As 
Schlegel states regarding the discipline of philosophy: "Die <p [Philoso-
phie] muß mit unendlich vielen Sätzen anfangen, der Entstehung nach 
(nicht mit einem)." (KFSA XVIII 26, 93) Secondly, the alternating 
principles cannot be grounded in, nor can they function as the ground 
for, anything resembling the "fundamental structures of conscious-
ness," even if this consciousness is to be conceived in transcenden-
tal, intersubjective terms, or in purely speculative terms, rather than 
within the framework of the individual subject. The Wechselerweis of 
consciousness - the opposition and reciprocal relation between the 
"I" and the "Not-I" - constitutes a very basic, primitive and limited 
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enactment of the "alternating principle," and represents an extension 
of the historical, hermeneutic-philological, and ethical-political alter-
nating principles, where it first attains its real existence, rather than 
an originary source of such alternations. Third, alternation operates 
not merely within the constantly alternating, differential communica-
tivity between subjects, but within the various modalities of scientific 
disciplines, e.g. grammar, criticism and interpretation in the case of 
philology, and between scientific disciplines, e.g. philosophy and phi-
lology, philosophy and history, logic and history. Only as aseries of 
polemical, enhancing, heightening intersubjective and interdisciplin-
ary operations or processes can Wechselerweis achieve its adequate 
profile in Schlegel's philosophical discourse 1796-97. 
To delimit and define alternation in terms of a discussion of tran-
scendental conditions or as a foundational structure of consciousness 
(Naschert), to adhere to the idealist reading of the alternating prin-
ciple that has dominated scholarship in this area since Behler's and 
Frank's interventions thus seems to foreclose the possible alternation 
that Schlegel's texts sought to set in motion. If we allow the alternat-
ing principle to simply replace the Fichtean thetic postulate, or rein-
scribe it within the horizon of a transcendental pragmatics, we have 
surely lost the rhetorical, performative force of Schlegel's provocation, 
which was precisely to have us take leave of the foundationalist frame-
work and open the philosophical discipline itself to interferences from 
other disciplines such as history, philology, and literature. I suggest 
we return to the alternations of Schlegel's texts and their terms, in the 
sense of a material hermeneutics that does not subsurne the manifold 
of interpretation under a single, univocal principle, concept, or set of 
ahistorical transcendental conditions. Such a material hermeneutics 
rather proceeds, as Schlegel stated in Zur Philologie, as a micrology 
from the specifics of the material itself to more general principles. 
(Arndt 1997, 6; Leventhal 2007) Such a material hermeneutics con-
tinues the alternating principles as aseries of interpretive actions, as 
a manifold still to be enacted and interpreted, as an Aufgabe or task. 
Such movements of alternation serve neither identity nor coherence, 
but rather processes of subjective, disciplinary and political self-dis-
placement and/or differentiation, deemed by Schlegel to be impossible 
within the completely specular, enclosed, and circular movement of 
Fichte's system, between otherwise fixed positions or principles. In 
this sense, Schlegel's "alternating principles" functioned as discourse 
to destabilize calcified concepts and disciplines, and open up areas 
of study in which the disciplines and their derivative sciences could 
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henceforth be progressively articulated in terms of limits and relations, 
two of the modern "categories" of philological inquiry according to 
Schlegel: "- Weit mehr muß insistirt werden auf den Historismus, der 
zur Philol. [Philologie] nothwendig. Auf Geist, gegen den Buchstaben. 
Das gehört mit zum Historismus, so wie auch Gesetze, Arten, Stufen, 
Gränzen, Verhältnisse pp Ganzheit pp <Lage, Classizität>." (KFSA 
XVI, 35, 8) Through the supplementarity29 provided by intra- and 
interdisciplinary alternation and oscillating confirmation, Schlegel's 
discourse on and of alternation staked out the interdependency and 
historicity of the human sciences without grounding them in a single, 
ahistorical principle, concept, discipline, foundation, or set of con-
ditions: "Niemand versteht sich selbst, in so fern er nur er selbst und 
nicht zugleich ein andrer ist. [Schlegel's italics, RL] Z.B. wer zugleich 
<pA [Philolog] und <pa [Philosoph] ist, versteht seine <pa [Philosophie] 
durch seine <pA [Philologie] und seine <pA [Philologie] durch seine <pa 
[Philosophie]." (KFSA XVIII, 84, Nr. 651) Precisely in this regard, in 
its resistance to originary grounding and mono-disciplinary fixation, 
Schlegel's Wechselerweis distinguishes itself from the dominant tran-
scendental strategies of idealist philosophy of this period. 
This statement from Schlegel's Philosophische Fragmente. Erste 
Epoche. II of 1797 tells us much not only about Wechselerweis, but 
about Schlegel's specific contribution to early German romantic phi-
losophy. Modern philosophy, Schlegel argued, has three important 
characteristics: first. it has no absolute zround, onlv aseries of alter-
nating principles; secondly, modern philosophy is historical, always in 
astate of becoming;30 and, finally, it must be systematic in the sense 
that it must necessarily traverse subjective, intersubjective, and dis-
ciplinary boundaries; that is, it cannot exist without entering into a 
conversation with the disciplines of the human sciences. To the extent 
that we engage in "study" (Studium), which for Schlegel was precisely 
reading, writing, and communicating across such disciplines (history, 
logic, rhetoric, high er and lower criticism, aesthetics, poetry and lit-
erature), we are able to forge contingent and conditional historical 
interpretations. Such a network of historical, interdisciplinary "alter-
29 On the logic of the supplement in Schlegel's early texts, see Wellbery 1987, espe-
cially 164-167. 
30 Compare Plug 2004, 33: "Philosophy now emerges as a process, one that Friedrich 
Schlegel describes in chemical terms and as composed of 'living, fundamental 
forces'." "Necessarily always in astate of becoming, philosophy 'always must 
organize and disorganize itself anew.'" 
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nating principles" or Wechselerweise as a propaedeutic to any material 
hermeneutics is still decisive today. Operating at the intersections of 
modern human scientific disciplines, Wechselerweis explicitly opened 
up an interdisciplinary area for the interaction between philosophy, 
phiIology, and history, suspending disciplinary boundaries in the 
process. A genealogy of the theory and practice of interdisciplinary 
programs and cultural studies at the end of the 20th and in the 21 st 
centuries would thus have to begin with Friedrich Schlegel and this 
critical aspect of early German romantic philosophy. 
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